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10.  Two scientists for every man, 
woman and dog in America? 
How sustainable is globalisation?
Raphael Kaplinsky
INTRODUCTION
In 1957, at a high point in the Cold War, the Russians launched the fi rst 
satellite – the Sputnik. The fact that the Russians had got into space fi rst 
came as a great shock to the Americans, who responded with a crash 
investment programme in the training of scientists and technologists. 
Jahoda calculated that if this increase in human resource investment had 
been sustained over the decades, by 1992 there would be two scientists for 
every man, woman and dog in America (Jahoda 1973).
The fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century feels a little like 1957. To 
many it appears as if the momentum of globalisation is unstoppable. 
But a moment’s refl ection suggests that a more cautionary attitude is in 
order. For one thing, the spread of globalisation is uneven. It is true that 
there has been an accelerating removal of barriers to trade (especially in 
manufactures) and the cross-border fl ow of capital and that this has been 
associated with a deepening in the breadth and intensity of economic inte-
gration. However, many barriers to cross-border integration persist, not 
least in controls over the fl ow of people, especially those with little educa-
tion and skills. There is also little sign of the withering away of the nation 
state, although its functions and purview are nevertheless in a state of fl ux 
(Weiss 2002). For another thing, the idea that globalisation is unstoppable 
fails to take on board the experience of history. The last decades of the 
nineteenth century represented a similar phase of rapidly deepening global 
integration which also seemed unstoppable to many. Yet it came to an 
end in an abrupt and brutal form, with the loss of many millions of lives, 
and it was only half a century later that we entered a new phase of global 
integration (Kaplinsky 2005).
In this chapter we will address four factors which caution against the tri-
umphalism of the contemporary globalisation agenda. In each case, these 
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represent countervailing forces which are endogenous to the system, that 
is, which arise out of the very success and extension of the global economy. 
The fi rst of these factors is the disruptive potential of China and India; the 
second refl ects the environmental sustainability of continued globalisa-
tion; the third focuses on insecurity and the sustainability of the logisti-
cal arteries of globalisation; and the fourth addresses the countervailing 
political forces unleashed by the patterns of inequality which result from 
the extension of globalisation.
THE DISRUPTIVE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN DRIVERS
On current trends, China will be the second biggest economy in the world 
by 2016, and India the third largest by 2035. A cluster of other countries in 
the Asian region, such as Thailand and Vietnam, are also growing rapidly. 
These newly dynamic Asian economies can collectively be characterised as 
the ‘Asian Drivers’ of global change. The economic processes they engen-
der are likely to radically transform regional and global economic, politi-
cal and social interactions and to have a major impact on the environment. 
This is a critical disruption to the global economic and political order that 
has held sway for the past fi ve decades.
The two key Asian Driver economies are China and India. But they 
refl ect very diff erent growth paths. China is integrated into an outward-
oriented regional economy, involving fi ne divisions of labour predomi-
nantly in manufacturing sectors. Its growing global presence is in large 
part a direct consequence of the extension of the global economy since to 
a very large extent its export boom refl ects the participation by Chinese 
fi rms and China-based trans-national corporations (TNC) subsidiaries 
in global value chains. Nearly 60 per cent of China’s exports and more 
than 70 per cent of its exports of machinery and electronic products are 
classifi ed for fi scal purposes as ‘processing trade’, involving the import of 
intermediates and capital goods (largely from the East Asia region) for the 
manufacture and assembly of fi nal products for export (Fu 2003). In the 
case of India, export earnings are signifi cantly driven by the incorpora-
tion of Indian software in global service sector value chains. But India’s 
 manufactured exports are beginning to grow rapidly too.
Although incorporated into the global economy in diff erent sectors, 
China and India pose similar major and distinct challenges for the global 
and developing economies, for fi ve major reasons.
The fi rst is as a consequence of their size. As Figure 10.1 shows, from 
the beginning of their growth spurts (1979 and 1992, respectively), neither 
GDP or export growth in the two largest Asian Driver economies were 
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unique. In recent years other Asian economies (for example, Japan and 
Korea) have experienced similarly rapid growth paths. However, whilst 
China accounted for 20 per cent of the world’s population and India for 
17 per cent in 2002, at no time did the combined population of Japan and 
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Figure 10.1  Growth of GDP and exports from onset of rapid growth: 
China, India, Japan and Korea
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Korea’s exceed four per cent of the global total. So, unlike the case of 
Korea and Japan, who could grow without severe disruption to the global 
economy, we have to suspend the ‘small-country’ assumption in the case of 
the Asian Drivers. The very high trade intensity of China’s growth makes 
the big-country eff ect particularly prominent in its case. Between 1985 and 
2005, China’s exports rose from $50bn to $772 billion, transforming China 
into the world’s third largest trading nation.
This trade intensity of growth is having a major impact on the terms 
of trade (Kaplinsky 2008a). As a consequence of a rapid growth in Asian 
Driver exports of manufactures, the prices of many manufactures either 
began to fall after the mid 1990s, or their rate of price-increase slowed con-
siderably. At the same time, the embodied material content of these manu-
factured exports and their common heavy investments in infrastructure 
has led to a rapid and probably sustained rise in the demand for, and price 
of, commodities. The resultant change in the terms of trade challenges 
not just traditional growth strategies (which have historically favoured a 
move from the primary sector to industry), but the political coalitions in 
individual countries supporting this growth path.
Second, the rise of the Asian Drivers has been associated with very sig-
nifi cant, and growing, imbalances in the global economy. By 2006 these 
imbalances were most evident with respect to the US and China. Figure 
10.2 provides data on their respective trade imbalances. The US – the 
world’s second largest trading economy – had sunk from a current account 
defi cit of minus $113bn (minus 1.5 per cent of GDP) to minus $857bn 
(minus 6.5 per cent of GDP) in 2006. By contrast, in the same time-period, 
China’s current account surplus had grown from a mere £1.6bn (0.3 per 
cent of GDP) to $239bn (9.1 per cent of GDP). A related imbalance con-
cerns fi nancial fl ows. Arising in large part as a result of its growing current 
account surplus, by mid-2007 China held foreign exchange reserves in 
excess of $1.4trillion. These reserves are large, and compare with the total 
value of FDI stock in the US of $1.7trillion. Depending on how these 
reserves are utilised – for example, to buy up assets of large western fi rms 
– there is potential for substantial confl ict and the possible impositions of 
controls over foreign ownership in the large previously dominant industr-
ialised economies, undermining the mobility of global fi nancial fl ows.
The third reason why the Asian Drivers may disrupt the global economy 
is that China (especially) and India embody markedly diff erent combina-
tions of state and capitalist development compared with the industrialised 
world. Chinese enterprises have their roots in state ownership, usually 
arising from very large and often regionally-based fi rms (Nolan 2005; 
Shankar 2005). They refl ect a complex and dynamic amalgam of prop-
erty rights – ‘The ownership of each of China’s large SOEs [state owned 
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enterprises] has spread gradually among a variety of public institutions, 
each of which has an interest in the fi rm’s performance . . . [b]ased on the 
‘ownership maze’ and vaguely defi ned property rights’ (Nolan 2005: 169). 
With access to cheap (and often subsidised) long-term capital, these fi rms 
operate with distinctive time-horizons and are less risk-averse than their 
western counterparts (Tull 2006). Indian fi rms are probably less distinct 
from the western model, but often include elements of social commit-
ment which are largely alien to western fi rms (Humphrey, Kaplinsky and 
Saraph 1998). Associated with these complex forms of ownership and 
links to regional and central state bodies, Chinese fi rms often operate 
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abroad as a component of a broader strategic thrust. This is particularly 
prominent in China’s advance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in its search 
for the energy and commodities required to fuel its industrial advance 
(Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2006). What this means is that Asian 
Driver fi rms tend to operate with much longer time-horizons and are less 
averse to risk than their western counterparts. Moreover, their base in 
low income economies means that they are not subject to the same pres-
sures regarding corporate and environmental social responsibility, fuelling 
accusations by previously hegemonic western fi rms of ‘unfair practice’.
The fourth reason why the Asian Drivers present a new and signifi cant 
challenge to the global and developing economies is that they combine 
low incomes and low wages with signifi cant innovative potential. This 
means that they are able to compete across the range of factor prices. The 
oft-stated belief (and hope?) that China will run out of unskilled labour 
is belied by the size of its reserve army of unemployed, estimated at being 
in excess of 100m compared to the 83m people employed in formal sector 
manufacturing in 2002 (Kaplinsky 2005). As Shankar observes, ‘China’s 
enormous labor reserves, with pay scales radically lower in the hinterland 
than the coast and in urban areas (the average income on the farm, where 
more than half of the Chinese population lives, is less than $25 per month), 
creates the equivalent of a country within a country; so, instead of Vietnam 
or Bangladesh replacing China as a labour-intensive haven, Hunan will 
replace Guangdong’ (Shankar 2005: 134). Moreover by 2030, India, also 
with a large reserve army of underemployed, is likely to have a larger – and 
younger – population than China. But China and India are not content to 
operate in this world of cheap labour and mature technologies, and are 
investing heavily in the building of technological capabilities. China, for 
example, overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest investor in 
R&D in 2006 (Keeley and Wilsdon 2007; Leadbeater and Wilson 2007).
A fi fth disruptive consequence of the rise of the Asian Drivers is their 
quest for secure supplies of raw materials. In the 2005–07 period this was 
an agenda largely played out in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and largely 
in relation to access to energy. China became an active investor in the 
Sudan and Angola, in both cases in the search for secure oil supplies, and 
in both cases running against established policy agendas of the hitherto 
hegemonic western powers, and displacing western energy fi rms. In Sudan 
this led to an easing of the pressure over Dharfur; in Angola it allowed the 
government to escape pressure exerted by the Paris Club on transparency 
in government. In Angola, China and India competed directly for access 
to the fuel deposits, in other cases (as in West Africa) they concentrated 
on diff erent countries. But it is not just oil that the Asian Drivers have tar-
geted in SSA. China has become a heavy investor in the Zambian copper 
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fi elds, and in various mineral sectors in South and West Africa. Similarly, 
it is not just in SSA or in oil that their resource hunger is likely to be felt 
as a disruptive factor. A shortage of softwood for the building industry in 
2007 was a direct consequence of China’s demand for timber, and water, 
too, has begun to loom on the horizon as a potential source of competitive 
positioning.
As a consequence of these impacts, the Asian Drivers are beginning 
to disrupt the ‘political compact’ which has underwritten the extension 
of globalisation in the post WW2 era. China and India are increasingly 
active in global institutions, demanding greater say in the regulation and 
shaping of the global economy. Their own experience belies the effi  cacy of 
the Washington Consensus policy agenda, and China and India provide 
a diff erent policy role-model for many developing economies, with the 
possible rise of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ to rival the Washington Consensus 
(Ramo 2004). These dynamics represent a transition from a quasi-unilat-
eral US-dominated world order to a multipolar power constellation. This 
is likely to lead to new turbulences and confl icts between the rising and 
the declining powers within the global governance system (Gu, Humphrey 
and Messner 2008).
None of these Asian Driver related factors – the large country eff ect on 
the terms of trade; trade and fi scal imbalances; the distinctive nature of 
Asian Driver fi rms; competition across the range of technology-intensity 
in trade and innovation; and the quest for resources – are in themselves 
likely to undermine the extension of the global economy. But, and largely 
as a consequence of their size, together they make up a signifi cant disrup-
tive challenge to the global order. In this context it is worth bearing in 
mind the lesson from history, since one of the primary reasons for the 
descent of the global economy into war in the early years of the twentieth 
century was the failure of the old imperial powers to allow a new entrant 
– Germany – to play a key role in the forming of global architecture. A 
similar challenge faces the global regime now that dynamic new entrants 
from the East are rising in the economic league and will soon be seeking 
to have this refl ected in the role they play in the fashioning of the global 
political and institutional architecture.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY OF 
GLOBALISATION
Writing in the fi rst half of nineteenth century Ricardo built his theory of 
rent on the variable quality and diminishing marginal productivity of land. 
He argued that in the context of limited land in the UK, land-rents would 
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become increasingly important and skew incomes towards unproductive 
landlords. This led him to oppose the Corn Laws which between 1815 
and 1846 protected UK agriculture by placing tariff s on food imports. 
The abolition of barriers to food imports – that is, deepening globalisa-
tion – meant that the land frontier could be stretched, allowing economic 
growth in the UK (and elsewhere) to proceed without being constrained 
by a Malthusian squeeze on resources.
In 1972, almost 150 years after Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy 
(1817), and 175 years after Malthus’s 1798 Essay on the Principles of 
Population, a group of scientists published a book entitled The Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al, 1972). The Limits to Growth revisited Malthusian 
principles and challenged Ricardo’s assumption of an unconstrained land 
frontier. It argued that natural resources are fi nite and that their short-
age would ultimately undermine the sustainability of global growth. The 
Limits to Growth provoked a stormy response. It was accused of mind-
less projection (‘Malthus with a computer’), being too pessimistic about 
technological change and failing to recognise the importance of the price 
mechanism in fostering technical substitution away from scarce resources 
(Cole et al. 1973).
But, by the new millennium, the easy dismissal of The Limits to Growth 
was being revisited, and as numerous authors point out (for example, Sachs 
and Santarius 2005), there are indeed physical limits to the sustainability 
of growth. These physical limits include both the exhaustion of resources, 
and the negative environmental spillovers which result from sustained 
growth. As a consequence there is an increasing crescendo of normative 
calls for economic slowdown and for the contraction of consumption, 
especially in high income economies (Sachs and Santarius 2005).
Much of this recent literature fails to root environmental exhaus-
tion and degradation in an analytical understanding of the nature of 
the accumulation process. The key to this is to be found in the works of 
Schumpeter, Smith and Ricardo (Schumpeter 1961; Smith 1776; Ricardo 
1817). Schumpeter showed how the very breathing of the capitalist 
economy requires innovation – entrepreneurs, confronted by the intensity 
of competition which undermines profi tability, escape these competitive 
pressures by introducing new products and processes. Innovation and 
expansion are the basis of the capitalist system; they are its internal 
motor.
Writing some centuries before Schumpeter, Smith provided the key to 
understand how this accumulating motor of capitalism fuels a globalising 
economy. Using an example of a pin factory, Smith showed how the divi-
sion of labour led to an increase in productivity. Moreover, he argued, ‘the 
division of labour depends on the extent of the market’ – that is, the bigger 
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the market, the greater the division of labour, the greater the gains in pro-
ductivity, and the higher the profi t to the innovating capitalist. Ricardo’s 
contribution to this analytical story concerns the role played by diff ering 
national economies in this process of specialisation. His theory of com-
parative advantage provided the intellectual underpinning to globalisation 
by showing how if countries specialise in areas of relative advantage, there 
would be extensive mutual gains from global exchange and integration.
In the latter decades of the twentieth century, new forms of corporate 
organisation and interchange developed to facilitate the reaping of spe-
cialisation and scale at a global level. In particular, elaborate global value 
chains were constructed to allow for the production of ‘world products’ 
through the manufacture and assembly of components produced in very 
large numbers in globally dispersed plants (Gereffi   2005; Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2001). These global value chains include the geographical speciali-
sation not just of discrete physical processes, but increasingly also of the 
knowledge-intensive and service components of the design, production 
and delivery of an increasing range of diversifi ed goods and services.
The environmental challenge confronting the global economy in the 
twenty-fi rst century thus takes two forms. The fi rst is a refl ection of physi-
cal aggregates. There are a growing number of mouths to feed, bodies to 
clothe and wants to satisfy. These place physical limits on the capacity 
of the biosphere to meet these needs. This has very little to do with the 
extension of globalisation itself other than the possibility that globalisa-
tion fosters growth, and growth fosters consumption. However, secondly, 
some of the demands placed on the biosphere not only refl ect the physical 
aggregates of consumption (tonnes of food, steel, and so on), but also 
the manner in which these demands are met. Here, increasingly global 
value chains which make up modern production systems place enormous 
 pressures on the environment.
Take as an example, the issue of foodmiles in the retail sector. Global 
sourcing has become increasingly widespread. Typically, the fresh fruit 
and vegetable section of a supermarket in the UK contains a selection of 
products from Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala 
and Peru in Latin America; Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
in SSA; India, Israel, Thailand and Turkey from Asia, and from a range 
of other countries as well. In so doing supermarkets have been able to 
abolish seasonality in our food consumption, with a range of attractive, 
(over-) packaged (and often tasteless) products available 364 days a year. 
But this tells only part of the foodmiles story. How much of the packag-
ing, the print and inks, the components of the supermarket trolley, the 
lorries which deliver the products, the building materials in the chain and 
so on similarly depend on global supply chains? In each case, the diff erent 
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components of the chain have to be transported (and some times re-trans-
ported) over extensive distances.
All of this global sourcing is at a cost to the environment. Some of this 
is a direct outcome of global transport, as in the case of the Exxon Valdez 
oil-spillage in Alaska during the 1990s. But the bulk of this negative 
environmental impact is indirect, particularly through the link between 
increased energy consumption and global warming. For much of this intri-
cate system of global production depends on the low price of energy which 
makes it profi table to ship low-value added commodities and components 
around the world. Despite the claims of the hydrocarbon-lobby to the con-
trary, we now know that there is growing evidence of global warming, and 
that this is predominantly a consequence of increased carbon-emissions. 
We also are beginning to realise that one consequence of climate change 
is its disproportionate negative impact on poor people and low-income 
economies (Yamin 2004).
If we are to respond appropriately to global warming, then carbon-
based energy will have to be priced at its true environmental cost.1 But, 
if so, what will be the impact of this on the profi tability of globalised 
production systems? How many activities which are currently profi table 
will be unattractive should energy prices be increased signifi cantly? On 
the other hand, it is possible (and perhaps even depressingly probable) 
that despite the logic of forcing energy prices to a level which refl ects 
its true environmental cost, consumer resistance and the power of the 
hydrocarbon lobbies to block an increase in prices makes this an unlikely 
outcome. In this case, energy-intensive global value chains are likely to 
worsen global warming and hence exacerbate global poverty and inequal-
ity. This outcome, as we will see below, also challenges the sustainability 
of globalisation. So, either way – be it through higher energy prices or 
through the impact on poverty and inequality – the energy-intensity of 
globalised production systems poses a threat to the continued expansion 
of the globalised economy.
INSECURITY AND LOGISTICS
The onset and deepening of industrialisation witnessed the systematic 
application of science and technology to production. It has been an era of 
rationality, where status has been achieved rather than ascribed (Wilson 
and Wilson 1945). The expansion of industry coincided with the general 
weakening of religions and other belief systems built on the assumption 
of divine creation and the absoluteness of good and evil. For much of its 
history, the politics of industrialisation was built around class – organised 
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labour and its political representations pitching itself against organised 
capital with the state either being an instrument of the dominant class, or 
an arena for the contestation of class power. The geography of industry 
was the geography of cities, the place of residence of the working class 
which had either been expelled from rural areas and agriculture or had 
voluntarily left the rural areas in the search of higher incomes and better 
life-chances.
The second half of the twentieth century saw an explosion in the number 
and size of cities in the world. In 1950 there were 86 cities with a popula-
tion exceeding one million. By the turn of the millennium there were more 
than 400 cities with a population exceeding one million, and it is likely that 
by 2015 that number will have increased to more than 550 (Davis 2006). 
But the cities of the twenty-fi rst century are very diff erent to those beasts 
of the post industrial revolution period extending up to the last decades of 
the twentieth century. Contemporary cities are no longer primarily places 
of residence for industrial employees and their families. They now account 
for more than half of the world’s population (UN-Habitat 2003) and are 
increasingly populated by very many unemployed people, who have been 
displaced from agriculture in the rural areas, displaced from industrial 
employment due to import competition or, more likely, just failed to fi nd 
any form of productive employment.
These urban slum-based communities are very diff erent in character 
from the nineteenth and early twentieth century cities of the industrial 
world. As a consequence of the change in material basis of global cities, 
the social and political character of cities is altering. Belief systems 
are changing, and there has been an explosion of millenarian religions 
throughout the world – Pentecostal churches in Latin America, Africa and 
parts of the US, Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and parts of 
Asia and Hindu fundamentalism in South Asia. These are belief systems 
which believe in ‘magic’ solutions, and are built around moral absolutes. 
The political systems which they foster are less class-based institutions 
locked in verbal discourse and peaceful civil action, and more prone to the 
violent expression of needs, backed by millenarian belief systems.
How does this demographic and political transition relate to the growth 
and sustainability of globalisation? First, in many respects they are the 
outcome of the very success of the global economy. The combination of 
marked diff erentials in productivity between the leading and lagging pro-
duction systems and the openness of global borders has meant that glo-
balisation has been the major cause of the marginalisation of much of the 
world’s population (see below). The urban slums are not so much made up 
of people left behind by globalisation, but those displaced by the effi  ciency 
of the leading producers. This drama is currently being played out both 
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between economies and within economies. On the one hand, the effi  ciency 
of Asian Driver producers is squeezing competitors in other countries. For 
example, Chinese exports to Africa are, for example, displacing African 
workers from the clothing, footwear and furniture industries (Kaplinsky 
2008b); and Chinese exports to the US are undermining Latin American 
and Caribbean exporters of manufactures to the US (Jenkins, Peters and 
Moreira 2008). On the other hand, similar processes are occurring within 
large countries, especially in the two major Asian Driver economies. In 
both China and India, the gap in incomes between the urban and rural 
areas is growing, with a massive overhang of un- and underemployed 
labour.
There is another link between the changing nature of global demograph-
ics and the associated political processes, although this link is more con-
tentious, it is one which sees a direct link between the hegemonic success 
of globalisation and the rise of global terrorism.2 The argument goes as 
follows.3 Through its ‘cultural’ extension of TV, fi lms, printed media and 
especially advertising, globalisation has spread a pattern of behaviour and 
values which has become increasingly off ensive to many ‘traditional’ belief 
systems. They also promote ‘wants’ which cannot be satisfi ed in their eco-
nomic contexts, leading to frustration and crises of expectations. This has 
provided fertile soil for pre-modern and millenarian fundamentalist faiths. 
The response of some of these has been to attack the many manifestations 
of globalisation – the ‘World Trade Center’ (the name itself evokes the 
hegemony of global processes), tourist centres associated with western 
values (night clubs in Bali), airports and civil aircraft. It is true that the 
early generations of fundamental terrorism were led by and often popu-
lated by educated people, but the ‘sea’ in which they swam, and the subse-
quent generations of activists have increasingly included the marginalised 
masses living in these urban- and peri-urban slums.
The question is what impact these oppositional groups will have on the 
sustainability of globalisation? The issue here is the extent to which the 
current waves of terrorism continue and/or intensify, and the degree to 
which they will target the manifestations of global interchange. We are in 
unknown territory here and it is a judgement call on both counts. My own 
conclusions are that in both cases the likely outcome will be inimicable to 
the sustained expansion of the global economy. That is, the incidence of 
terrorist actions are likely to grow rather than to subside, and secondly, 
that they will continue to target the logistical arteries of globalisation and 
the ideological manifestations of the globalising capitalist economy. The 
consequence will be to harden some of the arteries of the global system and 
to hamper the ease with which people, products and capital fl ow across 
national borders.
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UNEQUALISATION AND COUNTERVAILING 
POLITICAL FORCES
Globalisation forces alterations in economic specialisation. The result is 
frequent and signifi cant change in employment patterns, in work-organi-
sation and institutional design. Perhaps more importantly, it has also led 
to signifi cant changes in the pattern of income distribution. There are two 
key consequences of these related changes, both of which impinge on the 
sustainability of globalisation.
The fi rst is that life has become more insecure for many, including for 
articulate professionals in the high-income economies. Robert Reich, 
a sometime Secretary of State for Labor in the Clinton administration, 
wrote insightfully on this issue (Reich 1991). He observed that the US had 
a large and growing ‘underclass’; on top of this underclass, by defi nition, 
was an ‘overclass’. This, said Reich was not new, But what was new was 
the character of the in-between category – ‘the anxious class’. To a sig-
nifi cant extent this growing anxiety and unease is a direct consequence of 
the imperative for continual ‘re-invention’ forced by global competition. 
Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric (GE) in the US, was widely 
considered to be one of the select number of truly infl uential manage-
ment innovators during the 1990s. His philosophy was to force a regular 
turnover of staff  in all GE subsidiaries, however well they were perform-
ing. Managers were expected to evaluate and ‘weed-out’ the least-well-
performing group of employees on an annual basis, however competent 
they were in performing their allocated tasks. In the early years of the 
millennium, GE promoted a ’70:70:70 policy’ – 70 per cent of activities to 
be outsourced; 70 per cent of this outsourcing to be off shored (that is, sent 
abroad); and 70 per cent of this off shoring to go to low-wage economies. It 
is an agenda of uncertainty, distrust and fear. This is echoed in the world-
view of the head of Intel, Andy Groves, who wrote a best-seller entitled 
‘Only the paranoid survive’ (Groves 1996). In each case the prognosis was 
change – ‘reinvention’, ‘reorganisation’, ‘business process engineering’ in 
order to survive the pressures of international competition. It is a world of 
insecurity, fear and anxiety, and one which threatens to engender opposi-
tion to globalisation, the more so as the professional classes in the high-
income economies are now being threatened by the off shoring of their own 
jobs to India and other lower-wage economies.
It is not just that the changes induced by globalisation have led to wide-
spread fear and anxiety (including amongst the articulate professional 
classes in high-income economies), but it has also resulted in growing ine-
quality. There is a clear link between the extension of the global economy 
and patterns of income distribution, and in order to understand this we 
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need to draw on three related sets of theory in economics – on rents, on the 
reserve army of labour and on the factor price equalisation theorem. We 
begin with Ricardo and Schumpeter on rent.
As pointed out above, Ricardo and Schumpeter both placed consid-
erable emphasis on rent in explaining the distribution of income. For 
Ricardo, rent was the charge which arose from the diff erential quality of 
land. It led to income being accrued by those owning more productive 
land, with the rent refl ecting the diff erential in productivity between the 
productive and the marginal parcels of land. Those owning marginal land 
would, he argued, be driven down to Malthusian levels of subsistence. 
Schumpeter expanded this concept of diff erential access by throwing light 
on gaps arising from unequal access to constructed ‘innovation rents’. 
In both cases, rent-rich super-profi ts arose as a consequence of barriers 
to entry. In the case of land, there are limits to the availability of pro-
ductive land. In the Schumpeterian framework, there are barriers to the 
ability to command the highest levels of technology, the most eff ective 
 entrepreneurial capabilities, the most eff ective forms of organisation, and 
the most well-known products. The higher these barriers and the greater 
the diff erential in productivity, the greater the incomes accruing to those 
who are protected from competition.
The contribution of Marx to this story is that he focused on the 
income recipients who are not able to hide behind these barriers (Marx 
1876). Marx was concerned with returns to labour, and he argued that 
unemployment is a structural feature of capitalist development. Rising 
capital intensity – he referred to it as the organic composition of capital 
–  displaced labour and created a reserve army of labour which ensured 
that wages were held down. Whether this process of wage compression 
occurs depends on the rates of investment, the rate of increase in capital 
intensity (usually refl ected in productivity growth) and the growth in the 
labour force. As an observed reality, it is commonly believed that Marx 
got the numbers wrong, since most of the advanced capitalist economies 
were able to sustain both near-full employment and rising wages through 
the  eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His ‘error’ was largely 
due to his overestimating the growth of the labour force.
The fi nal plank of this explanation of the link between globalisation 
and inequality is known ad the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor price 
equalisation theorem in mainstream economic trade theory (Heckscher 
1919; Ohlin 1933; Samuelson 1948). It argues that free trade will lead to an 
equalisation of wages (and indeed returns to capital) as the forces of com-
petition work through the system. Global competition drives out high cost 
producers and, indirectly, thus high-cost factors. This outcome occurs as a 
consequence of free trade, and irrespective of the mobility of factors.
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Now if we put these various strands together we can understand how it is 
that globalisation leads to growing inequality, and why levels of unequali-
sation have risen in recent decades. The argument goes as follows. Rising 
investments in innovation have led to increased diff erentials in productiv-
ity. ‘Productivity’ is to be understood not just in relation to physical output 
in relation to physical input, but also in processes, relations between fi rms 
and in returns to brandnames (Coca Cola) and celebrity identities (the 
David Beckham eff ect). These rising investments in innovation are pro-
tected by tightened intellectual property rights and are promoted by heavy 
investments in marketing (again, the David Beckham eff ect). The income 
recipients who are able to protect themselves from competition are, in a 
globalised world, able to reap enormous economies of scale, on a global 
level, and to garner signifi cant incomes. They include skilled people and 
celebrities in both high-income and low-income countries. The fl ip side of 
this is that those who are unable to hide behind eff ective barriers to entry 
similarly fi nd themselves in a large global pool, but in this case they are 
having to compete with a very large reservoir of similarly ‘rent-deprived’ 
actors. This is the reserve army of labour which Marx referred to.4 But 
whereas in Marx’s time and in the period before the late twentieth century 
the pool of labour was artifi cially constrained by restrictions on migration 
and on trade in fi nal products, in recent decades these barriers have fallen 
and the rent-poor income recipients (essentially the unskilled and the semi-
skilled) have become increasingly subject to global competition. This is 
directly analogous to the removal of the corn laws in nineteenth century 
England which led to a fall in the incomes of agricultural landlords.
A recent paper by Dew-Becker and Gordon highlights some astonish-
ing trends in this distributional pattern. Focusing on the US between 1966 
and 2001, they calculate that the median real wage grew by only 11 per 
cent in real terms, rising at 0.3 per cent per annum. This compares with an 
increase of productivity growth of 1.57 per cent per annum, and a growth 
in real incomes of the top one-tenth of the top one per cent (that is the 
99.9th percentile) of 5.6 per cent per annum. They conclude that ‘[m]ore of 
the income change [between 1966 and 2001] accrued to the top one percent 
than the entire lower 50 percent, and more accrued to the top 1/100 percent 
than to the top 20 percent’ (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2005: 36). They 
identify two drivers of this inequality – the high incomes of ‘superstar’ 
celebrities, and the rapidly growing incomes of the senior management 
benefi ting not just from high salaries, but also from incentive schemes. To 
this we must add a third component, but at the bottom end of the income 
spectrum. That is the compression of wages due to rising pressure from 
imports and, in some cases, immigrants fl owing into the US from Mexico 
and elsewhere. Similar patterns of unequalisation have been experienced 
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in almost every country of the world, including especially in China (which 
has moved from being one of the most equal to one of the most unequal 
countries) and the anglo-saxon economies of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK which have embraced globalisation enthusiastically 
(Milanovic 2003; Kaplinsky 2005). The IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
in 2007 documented the fall in the share of labour in total incomes in all 
of the major high income economies and explained this as an outcome of 
competition from labour-rich low wage economies in the emerging world, 
particularly China and India (IMF 2007: Chapter 5).
Whether these distributional trends last depends on the size and growth 
of the global labour pool. Mainstream economic analysis suggests that it 
will be a self-correcting problem. It argues that as the labour market in 
China, India and elsewhere in the emerging economy world tightens due to 
their rapid economic growth, wages will rise around the world. But, given 
the numbers involved, even if Marx’s rising organic composition of labour 
does not lead to a growing structural surplus of labour, the numbers 
involved suggest that this tightening labour market will take some time 
to manifest itself. To repeat the numbers cited earlier. China’s formal 
sector manufacturing labour force is less than 85 million, whilst that of 
the 14 largest OECD economies is less than 80 million. This contrasts with 
estimates of China’s reserve army of labour of over 100 million, with even 
larger numbers of labour entrants waiting to join the global economy in 
India. The IMF estimates that ‘the eff ective global labor supply quadru-
pled between 1980 and 2005, with most of the increase taking place after 
1990’ (IMF 2007: 162).
What does all this have to do with the sustainability of globalisation? 
The point is that the rich are increasingly confi dent and bold, with a wide-
spread tendency to fl aunt their wealth. We know from previous eras in 
economic and political history that the impetus for social change comes 
not so much from changes in absolute deprivation, but from relative dep-
rivation (Runciman 1966), and it is this which perhaps above all threatens 
the sustainability of globalisation.
The lessons of the nineteenth century provide an important backdrop in 
understanding these possible developments in the early twenty-fi rst century 
(Williamson 1998). After fi ve to six decades of growing global integration, 
the world economy turned inwards after 1914, and the outward momen-
tum was only regained in the decades after 1950. In between saw a period 
of inward focus, and a reduction in economic integration. This reversal 
of global processes followed directly from the political consequences of 
very success of late-nineteenth century integration. Cheap grain imports 
into continental Europe led to a decline in agricultural profi ts. This 
resulted in the imposition of tariff s against agricultural imports in much 
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of Europe. The mass migration of unskilled Europeans into the US as 
60 million people, often literally walking across Europe, made their way 
to the US between 1820 and 1914, forced down relative wages in North 
America, and led to growing controls against migration. At the same time 
the competitiveness of European manufactures threatened the survival of 
the US’s nascent manufacturing sector. This resulted in the imposition of 
 beggar-my-neighbour tariff s against manufactures during the 1930s.
CONCLUSIONS
Both individual and institutional agency count in the shaping of history. 
In other words, no outcomes to historical processes can be predicted with 
any great sense of certainty since in large part history results from social 
action. Underlying forces may be at work, but how these play out, and 
over what time-period, may refl ect a variety of factors. Some of these 
factors may be internal to the system, others may be exogenous in nature.
Despite this inherent uncertainty, it is possible to point to some out-
comes as being relatively likely, and others as being less so. The argument 
in this chapter has been that it is unlikely that globalisation will proceed 
along the unfettered trajectory of the last decades of the twentieth century. 
This is because of a number of factors which threaten this trajectory, each 
of which is internal to the unfolding of globalisation itself. These can be 
grouped into four categories – the disruptive impact of the rise of the 
Asian Driver economies; the environmental unsustainability of energy-
intensive global value chains; the global insecurity arising out of the spread 
of global production and value systems; and the countervailing forces 
arising as a consequence of the unequalisation which is inherent in an 
globalising economy.
Each of these four factors holds the potential to not just disrupt the tra-
jectory of the last decades of the twentieth century, but to reverse it or to 
push it into new directions (for example, limiting the globalisation of trade, 
but not of fi nance). Together, either because some of these factors are 
causally inter-related, or because they just happen to occur conjuncturally, 
they make the likelihood of a challenge to unfettered global  integration 
even more likely. The possibility that there may be other factors external 
to the system – such as an environmental calamity or the mass spread of 
disease – only makes the likelihood of disruption more likely.
Although we may have some measure of confi dence in the predic-
tion of these developments, we have much less confi dence in what might 
spark such a change in direction, or how rapid and far-reaching these 
changes might be. For example, with hindsight, it is clear that the spread 
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of internationalisation in the nineteenth century would be interrupted. 
But it was much less clear that this interruption would take the form of 
a four-year war which would result in the death of more than 20 million 
people, and even less that this war would be sparked by an assassination in 
Sarajevo. Similarly, it is diffi  cult to predict what event, or what confl uence 
of events might act to shift the trajectory and pace of globalisation.
But, just as it was not possible for the Americans to produce two scien-
tists for every man, woman and dog in America (even if some of them were 
children!), or that nineteenth century internationalisation would proceed 
without hindrance, so it is unlikely that the drive to ever-deepening glo-
balisation in the twenty-fi rst century will proceed without signifi cant 
interruption.
NOTES
1. No realistic assessment of non-carbon based energy technologies suggests that they will 
arrest the carbon emissions of sustained global growth signifi cantly.
2. I use the word ‘terror’ here in the particular sense of acts of violence which target non-
combatant civilians. This defi nition includes both state-organised terror (for example, 
the bombing of civilians) and the acts of non-state terrorist cells. For many decades 
state-based military actions have been used to promote the spread of globalisation. The 
new factor is the use of non-state based terror to oppose its spread.
3. As in the discussion of the rise of millenarian religions (see above), I am here informed by 
Davis (2004).
4. It is also refl ected in the writings of W. A. Lewis on the labour surplus economy (W. A. 
Lewis, 1954).
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